Exhibit A

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, et al.,: Plaintiffs, -vs-: Case No. 1:18-cv-950 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC., et al.,: Defendants. : HEARING ON MOTIONS

February 15, 2019

Before: John F. Anderson, U.S. Mag. Judge

APPEARANCES:

Matthew J. Oppenheim, Scott A. Zebrak, and Jeffrey M. Gould, Counsel for the Plaintiffs

Thomas M. Buchanan and Jennifer A. Golinveaux, Counsel for the Defendants

e-mails by which they have got to connect the e-mails to this.

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I mean, the whole issue here is really they wanted

- 1 numbers. They want to show that they had 58,000 subscribers to
- 2 | whom they sent notices about and 168,000 notices. Now they
- 3 | want more notices to try to show they all equate with
- 4 | infringement, and they put us on notice, to enhance their
- 5 damages.
- 6 So this number is not really relevant. It's just
- 7 | that they want to create a chart with all these numbers.
- 8 THE COURT: Well, it's more work for you to have to
- 9 do something to replace that number; is that right?
- 10 MR. BUCHANAN: I don't think it is because we're
- 11 going to create a different type of formatted screen shot. And
- 12 | so, it would just leave that off.
- Again, we would have no problem with giving it if we
- 14 didn't think it was an issue and if we thought it was really
- 15 | relevant. I don't see this notion that this number is going to
- 16 | connect them to all these e-mails and they will be able to
- depose people about Joe Jones who infringed in 2013 and 2014
- 18 and '12 on their copyrights and then on some other copyrights.
- 19 | I just don't think there is e-mails out that there that are
- 20 like that. So --
- 21 THE COURT: All right. Let me -- what is the purpose
- 22 of you needing to have the ICOMS number as opposed to just some
- 23 unique identifier that you know that, you know, that relates to
- 24 this issue with this IP address, or whatever?
- MR. ZEBRAK: Yes, Your Honor. I would like to answer

that, and also respond to a couple of other things very
briefly.

So I think the starting point should be on Cox to justify why it needs to change the number. From our perspective, the reason we want the number is that's how it's records exist in the normal course. E-mail May cite to it.

And more importantly, when we work with witnesses in depositions, they're not going to understand some unique number that Winston & Strawn assigns to this. They will understand -- they will understand an ICOMS field.

And when we put a witness on the stand at trial, we're going to walk through the interrelatedness of the revenue information from its financial database with the notice data from its CATS database.

And the idea that somehow this could be used to identify a subscriber is really just preposterous. It's an internal database ID number within Cox. It's not the customer's account number on their billing statement. This is just an internal unique serial number they have ascribed to a subscriber for purposes of cross-referencing things internally.

So -- and there is no declaration in the Court about risks of disclosure of someone's personal identity from this.

THE COURT: Well, no, there is some information about their being concerned about the personal identifying information being included. But I understand your argument.

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MR. ZEBRAK: Yes, Your Honor. And that, of course,
that information though is about what could be subsumed within
the tickets. It has nothing to do with the personal nature of
an ICOMS ID.
          And Cox's counsel just mentioned that there is some
burden involved here. There is no articulated burden in
producing a summary level information, nor any burden involved
in going back to 2011 versus '12.
          And as Your Honor seized on already, their changing
normal course by assigning a proxy number to it that, you
know -- that only creates more work. So ...
          THE COURT: All right. Okay. For item number 3, I
am going to go ahead --
          MR. ZEBRAK: Oh. And, Your Honor, the only other
thing I would like to say on this, if we could, is at the last
hearing plaintiffs were required by Court order to produce
historical revenue data on its tracks at issue in the case
going back to 2011.
          So there seems to be sort of a parallel that we would
like to keep consistent.
          THE COURT: Well, revenue data and complaints are
apples and oranges.
          MR. ZEBRAK: Yes, Your Honor.
          THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?
          MR. ZEBRAK: No, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: All right. On item number 3, I'm going to require that they produce the information with the ICOMS ID. And that the time period will be 2012 through 2014. Okav. So that takes care of item number 3. Do you want to go 1 or 2 next? Which --MR. ZEBRAK: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Let's do the revenue one. MR. ZEBRAK: Yes, Your Honor. So as I mentioned a little while ago, the case, of course, is about Cox's continued provision of service to subscribers it knew were engaged in infringement. And what we want to be able to do is to correlate what Cox knew about those subscribers' infringement along with Cox's receipt of revenues from those infringers. And here Cox has -- you know, it's unclear, quite frankly, put in declarations that we think -- you know, the purpose of a declaration is, of course, to clarify and put the parties and the Court in a position to resolve the dispute. think that these declarations were more designed to just oppose the discovery rather than clarify what they have and how they have it. But whether they call it revenue information or billing information, you know, Cox knows what its subscribers paid to it over time. THE COURT: Well, it knows what it billed, and at least it is indicating that it can track or it is contained in

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- 14 the ICOMS system what was billed. And whether they don't collect on their bills or not, I don't know. But, you know, apparently they are trying to mistake a distinction as to what was billed and what are revenues. MR. ZEBRAK: Yes, Your Honor. But if I could expound on that slightly because I think it's a little more refined than that based on how they briefed it. So on the one hand they say, we don't track or maintain revenue information in this ICOMS database. At the same time they say, I don't have the exact words in front of me, but what we have here, we don't maintain complete revenue information. And that database lacks info next for accurately calculating revenue. THE COURT: Does it make any real difference to you whether it's billing information or revenue information? not getting down to, you know, nickels and dimes here. MR. ZEBRAK: Of course, Your Honor. Of course, Your Honor. THE COURT: And if somebody didn't pay their bill one month and they paid it the next month, and they maybe had to have an interest charge or something --
 - MR. ZEBRAK: Yes, Your Honor, right.
- 23 THE COURT: This is not going to get into the 24 granular nature of those kinds of things.
- 25 MR. ZEBRAK: Right. Right. Well, come at trial they

no doubt will attack us for our experts and our use with their witnesses. And when we try and calculate the sum total of what Cox received from these subscribers that it knew were engaged in infringement, it no doubt is going to try to beat us up saying it doesn't accurately reflect what it received.

But on the billing information, it does say that the ledger side of that system includes not just what it billed, but also information about accounts receivable and credits.

So it's unclear to us the nomenclature they're using about -- about revenue versus billing. And if they want to produce billing information instead of revenue information, if they'll -- if they'll stipulate right now that they won't at a trial say that what they actually received is less than what the system reflects on billing, that's fine with us.

You know, but the bottom line is, it knows who these subscribers are. It has information on how it benefitted from these subscribers financially.

And, you know, the information, Cox says it's only of marginal relevance. Nothing could be further from the truth than that. I mean, this goes squarely at a number of core issues in the case.

You know, there is a difference between us and Cox's counsel in our views of how to prove the financial interest prong of vicarious infringement. We think when it decides to keep a subscriber rather than terminating it, obviously all

that ill-gotten revenue after that is a direct financial benefit.

But without even delving into that issue, which is a little more legally dense, Cox has no argument against why the information we seek isn't super-strongly relevant to the statutory damages issues of Cox's profits as well as Cox's -- you know, the need to deter Cox.

And we need to see not just the aggregate Cox got from these subscribers it knew was infringement, but then correlate it against its decisions not to terminate them.

That's incredibly powerful evidence, and it's why Cox really doesn't -- doesn't want to produce that.

And quite frankly, it cites -- you know, it goes on in its declarations about the costs of doing it manually. But we're not interested in them doing this manually. Just as plaintiffs are required to do in response to a number of discovery requests, we're running reports to figure out how to pull information out. And in the context of this case and these issues, \$15,000 is something that the parties are routinely absorbing.

So, you know, again, we just think it's very relevant. It's all in one database, and we would like it produced. And we would like them, if they are not going to produce revenue information, which we don't think they have articulated that they lack, we would like them to produce at

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     least this billing information and be held to -- be held to
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     the proposition of that's what it received in revenue.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MR. ZEBRAK: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Thank you.
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               First help me understand the difference between the
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     billing and the revenue argument.
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               MS. GOLINVEAUX: Yes, Your Honor. So ICOMS is Cox's
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     subscriber management system. The records that the plaintiffs
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     are seeking, this is not the kind of report that Cox could run.
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     It doesn't track revenue on a per subscriber basis. So it
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     doesn't have a business need to run that type of report in the
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     ordinary course.
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               So as is described in the Jarchow declaration, this
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     would require, to do this in an automated way -- automated way,
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hiring an outside engineer to come in and write code to create this special report they are seeking --

THE COURT: I mean, you have got the information, it's just how are you going to access it. Okay.

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So what I'm trying to find out is, you know, what's the word game between billing and revenue? I mean, if I called Cox up right now and if I had a Cox account and I gave them my account number, they could pull up something that had, I assume, my billing information that would include what was I billed and whether those bills were paid, right?

MS. GOLINVEAUX: Your Honor, there is, as described in the declaration, there is the ledger section of ICOMS.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. GOLINVEAUX: And it does contain, in addition to the amount billed, certain account receivable information, like debits and credits.

And my understanding is that to create the report that processed all that in a meaningful way to show what was actually paid versus what was billed, is a more complicated process and more involved process.

THE COURT: Is there any generic information as to Cox receives 98 percent of its billings? I mean, if this is a situation where you're going to try and make some, you know, cute argument that they were only billed and that doesn't indicate what we actually got as revenues, I want them to have some generic information they can use to say, okay, they only gave us the billing information, but historically Cox, you know, gets money in the door for 98 percent of its billings, or 90 percent of its billings, or whatever it actually -- the realization rate for its billings for subscribers.

Is there that kind of information available?

MS. GOLINVEAUX: For the time period at issue, Your

Honor, I am just not sure if they have that, that information about percentages of dollars they collect off of the billing information. Off the bills, the amounts billed.

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THE COURT: Well, that's the kind of information that you would think would routinely be looked at and analyzed by the business people within the organization, wouldn't it? MS. GOLINVEAUX: It certainly may, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. All right. So the billing information, help me understand what the situation is with that. You have to pay somebody \$15,000 to prepare some type of script or program or program to run to get this information from the database that you have maintained. Okay? MS. GOLINVEAUX: That's correct, Your Honor. And we think that -- counsel talked about the relevance of this information. We think that they are just wrong about the vicarious liability issue. Vicarious liability requires right, ability to control, and a direct financial benefit. There is no dispute that Cox bills for its services, its Internet service. The amount it billed to each of these 58,000 subscribers is not relevant to the direct financial benefit prong of vicarious. And in light of the marginal relevance and the fact that Cox cannot create these reports in the ordinary course and is going to have to hire an engineer to go in and write a script to extract it, we think it's not appropriate. THE COURT: Okay. What about the time period, your argument on that. MS. GOLINVEAUX: Your Honor, they're asking for the

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information for more than eight years, from 2011 to the
present. If Your Honor is inclined to order it, we think that
the claims period is the relevant time period. They're saying
it's relevant to damages. What Cox billed these subscribers
before or after their claims period can't possibly be relevant
to statutory damages or actual damages.
          THE COURT: Well, why wouldn't -- if in fact you
should have terminated a customer in let's say January of 2014
based on, you know, 13 or 14 or 15 different complaints. And,
you know, you decided that, you know, we need to keep every
customer. And, you know, that customer is continuing to pay
Cox money now, why wouldn't that, to some extent, come into
play as to, you know, it was important for you not to terminate
this customer because you wanted that revenue stream going in
the future?
          MS. GOLINVEAUX: Well, Your Honor, that can't
possibly be relevant to damages. They can't seek -- they can't
show --
          THE COURT: Why wouldn't it go to willfulness?
willful act so that I could get this revenue stream for four or
five more years, or whatever the standard industry rate is
that, you know, somebody doesn't change their Internet service
or these kinds of providers, why doesn't that come into play as
to willfulness?
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MS. GOLINVEAUX: Because, Your Honor the standard for

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willfulness is whether Cox was aware that its actions with respect to the plaintiffs' works constituted infringement. And whether it was receiving revenue from these subscribers at issue years before or years after the claims period is not relevant to that inquiry. THE COURT: Okay. The script that would be written to do this, would it produce -- I mean, you made some comment about you only have this monthly. Would this be monthly information, or quarterly information, or what's the process that you would anticipate that information being generated? MS. GOLINVEAUX: If the -- if we're writing a script, I think it could be either monthly or annually because the script could roll it up by year. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let me hear from the plaintiff about the time period information and whether yearly or -- I assume you would want it -- you want it quarterly and yearly. I don't -- I am not sure why if you got it quarterly, why you would need it to be quarterly and yearly. But I assume you would want it on a monthly basis as opposed to a yearly basis; is that right? MR. ZEBRAK: Yes, Your Honor. Given that it's just pulling it out of a database, it's -- it will be more useful at a trial for us to be able to slice and dice the data different ways. And if it just wants to give us a report giving -giving the data monthly, that's absolutely fine with us.

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Your Honor, there are several statements I would like
to respond to, but if Your Honor is already inclined to find
that the information is relevant, I won't need to speak to
that.
          THE COURT: Well, the time period I do need to hear
you.
          MR. ZEBRAK: Yes, Your Honor.
          THE COURT: And I can understand why a brief,
historical time period might be appropriate, just to know if,
you know, whether this was a new big customer or a long-term
big customer, whatever.
          MR. ZEBRAK: Yes, Your Honor.
          THE COURT: But I'm still a little unsure as to how
significant the amount is to the present as opposed to whether
that customer continued for a year, or two years, or something
like that.
          MR. ZEBRAK: Yes.
          THE COURT: So why is the information going to, you
know, the present time significant?
          MR. ZEBRAK: Yes, Your Honor. So to be clear, there
are two issues on the time period. There is the claims period,
and then there is the before and the after.
          THE COURT: Right, right.
          MR. ZEBRAK: But I will begin with the after, as Your
Honor asked.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MR. ZEBRAK: So in terms of Cox's profits, and sort
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     of ill-gotten gains from continuing to provide service to these
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     subscribers it knew was engaging in infringement, obviously
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     however much money it kept receiving, you know, those
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     ill-gotten gains didn't stop at the end of our claims period.
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               You know, had it terminated that subscriber -- I
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     mean, Cox is free to make whatever arguments it wants to make
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     at a trial about our use of the revenue information being too
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     expansive or not. That really is a question for trial.
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               But if, you know, if Cox didn't terminate a customer,
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     and then that customer continued for another two years, or
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     continued to the present day, that's all ill-gotten revenue
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     that Cox shouldn't have received, and speaks to its profits, as
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     well as the need to deter Cox --
               THE COURT: Well, revenue and profits are two
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     different things.
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               MR. ZEBRAK: Yes, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: And, you know -- and I'm -- well, keep
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     going.
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               MR. ZEBRAK: Well -- no, sure. And it's certainly
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     entitled to come in and try and say, here is what we actually
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     made on these subscribers, not the gross receipts.
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               But even putting aside whether -- how you prove
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profits and the interaction between offsetting revenue with

costs, just the need to deter Cox, it's incredibly powerful if -- you know, it shows -- you know, what Cox wants to do is just produce the raw aggregate amount of money it made from certain division of its business. And then come at trial it's going to say, that's overbroad because it includes lots of subscribers who never infringed.

And what we want to do is just have the information showing how Cox received moneys from these subscribers it knew was engaging in infringement but chose to keep them.

And so, you know, we just think -- you know, going back earlier than the claims period, given Your Honor's ruling on the notice data being just 2012 rather than 2011, having it coterminous with that, you know, makes sense in terms of 2012 rather than going back to '11 because we can then see, okay, here is a subscriber, John Smith, here is what Cox was getting. It knew he was engaged in infringement, but yet Cox kept providing service. And look at how the revenues kept growing, maybe through to today.

And so, our experts, you know, might produce a report that calculates that.

I mean, the reason why they're fighting this so hard is because it's incredibly probative. And there is no additional burden -- you know, they're running a report to pull data from a database, and once they're doing that, I mean, I think the relevance is clear.

THE COURT: Well, a monthly report for 58,000 customers for additional years, you know, takes computer time to do that. I am not sure how much computer time.

MR. ZEBRAK: Yeah.

THE COURT: But, I mean, it generates a lot of information that then -- does that really bear any significant benefit to the parties in having what was -- you know, what this customer was billed in 2017 when you're talking about an infringement period that ended in 2014.

MR. ZEBRAK: Yeah. I mean, I just think, you know, when a -- look, if a company terminates my account with them, I am less likely to probably sign up with them again.

And the bottom line is, this is all revenue Cox wouldn't receive. It can make its arguments at trial, it can have its experts make its argument, but all this revenue -- I mean, what Cox wants to do is to say, look, this was a limited period of bad behavior at our company. And it wants to try and cabin everything into just this claim period.

And it wants to, you know, just produce its -- again, its overall data and not allow us to focus on the moneys it received from these bad subscribers. And in the context of this case, running a report on just -- you know, revenues from these subscribers, really just isn't -- isn't that demanding.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, I think I understand what the issues are there.

I do think -- you know, I can appreciate the defendants' argument that they don't agree this information is relevant. And whether it makes its way into the trial of this case will be something for Judge O'Grady to decide. But I do think at this point in time it is discoverable information.

And it is discoverable information that is available to Cox. The method that they maintain it, if it makes it difficult for them to gather that information, that still doesn't make it not relevant information.

And the idea that it's going to cost \$15,000 doesn't overwhelm me, to be honest with you. Given the nature of this case and the amount that is being spent to litigate this case, that doesn't really impact me on the proportionality argument. That, you know, that kind of investment to get relevant information to produce in this case doesn't tip the scales.

So I am going to require that revenue information attributable -- well, that billing information, yes, attributable to each subscriber for the time period from 2012 through 2016. That gives you one year early during the period, a five-year period. I think that gives you at least a point for your experts to look at to see, to generate, you know -- I assume your experts are going to also then, you know, not only try to do what they have gotten to date, but what will be going in the future. And this is -- that's enough information for them to deal with.

It needs to be done on a monthly basis. So that needs to be generated on a monthly basis. So it will be from -- a monthly basis from 2012 to 2016.

I also want you to investigate and find out whether there is available information concerning the realization rates on billing information for that time period from 2012 through 2016.

So that, you know, we don't get into this, you know, that was only what was billed, it wasn't really what was received. That there can be some general correlation as to billing and actual receipts from the company since you've indicated or represented to the Court that the revenue information is much more difficult to obtain. Okay.

All right, issue 2. You need to help me understand what it is really is you're asking for on this. Because, you know, if we're talking about every communication dealing with every infringement, that's not going to win any argument.

MR. ZEBRAK: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And so, I mean, it's a little unclear to me -- and, you know, it's difficult to order something that's unclear because I don't want to put the other side in a position of coming back and not knowing what it is I'm requiring them to do. So that you come back and say, they didn't do what you told them to do, and we have to come back in and say, I interpreted it as this, I interpreted it as that.